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The Federalist Society for Law
and Public Policy
presents
ORIGINALISM AND CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE
2005  National  Lawyer’s  Convention
November 10, 2005
PANELISTS:
Professor Ronald J. Allen, John Henry Wigmore Professor of Law,
Northwestern University School of Law
Professor Carol Steiker, Howard J. and Katherine W. Aibel Professor of
Law, Harvard Law School
Professor Craig S. Lerner, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and
Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law
Hon. Christopher A. Wray, King & Spalding litigation partner and Former
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice
Hon. Edith Brown Clement, United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
(moderator)
JUDGE CLEMENT: I am Edith Brown Clement, also known as Joy
Clement, from the Fifth Circuit, but actually I live in the Fourth Circuit
now,  thanks  to  Katrina.    I’m  glad  we  have  a  number  of  people  here  to  discuss originalism and criminal procedure.
As you all realize, there are several provisions in the United States
Constitution to affect criminal law, and most specifically, criminal procedure, which we will be discussing. The problem is what to do with the
technology that has developed over the past 200 plus years. There are several   areas   that   I’m   sure   the   founders   didn’t   contemplate,   such   as   digital  
communications, heat sensors which locate lamps growing marijuana, and
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ORIGINALISM_AND_CRIMINAL_Law_Panel_277-306

278

Chapman Law Review

4/10/2008 6:46 PM

[Vol. 11:277

the home of Black Berry/cell phone/future means of communication, which
reminds me, please turn yours off or silence them. Mine just rang, so I
know  they’re  probably  not  all  off.
We have a fascinating panel this afternoon. We have three professors
and a lawyer who has a wealth of experience in the criminal law field. Our
first speaker is Craig Lerner. He is a professor at George Mason University
School of Law, where he has been for five years. Before that, he was associated with the Office of Independent Counsel for several years, and he
practiced in the white-collar criminal field and the communications field.
He  was  a  law  clerk  in  the  D.C.  Circuit,  so  I’m  sure  he  was  exposed  a  lot  of  
criminal law there. Also, he was a teaching fellow at Harvard, which
makes sense because he was an undergraduate of Harvard, and also a graduate of Harvard Law, and then in his spare time got a masters at the University of Chicago. He has published a great deal, and I like some of the
titles. I will read them to you—Reasonable Suspicion and Mere Hunches;1
my favorite one, because I am from New Orleans, Louisiana, is Legislators
as the American Criminal Class.2 I’m  also  curious  about  The United States
PATRIOT Act: Promoting the Cooperation of Foreign Intelligence Gathering and Law Enforcement.3 There may be something we can discuss about
the PATRIOT Act with respect to the separation of powers, since they now
want  federal  judges  to  report  to  Congress  anyone  who’s  sentenced,  so  that  
they  can  evaluate  whether  it’s  correct  or  not.    I  think  that  could  be  a  problem. He has also published two articles on probable cause and an article on
joint defense agreements, which as you all know is just asking for trouble.
Our second panelist is Professor Robert Allen. He is presently at the
Northwestern University School of Law. He did his undergraduate work in
mathematics at Marshall University, which is helpful if you do have to deal
with  the  sentencing  guidelines,  since  most  lawyers  don’t  do  math.    Then,  he  
went to law school at the University of Michigan. He is an internationally
recognized expert in the fields of evidence, procedure, and constitutional
law.    He’s  published  many  books,  and  90  articles  and  major  law  review  articles in major law reviews. You may recognize him because he is in the
national broadcast media, discussing constitutional law and criminal justice
quite   frequently.      He’s   also   held   professorships   before   he   went   to   Northwestern,  at  Iowa  and  at  Duke,  and  he’s  lectured  at  a  number  of  national  and  
international laws schools. He has also been invited to give lectures to the
governments of China, Mexico, Trinidad, and Tobago. He spent the past
ten years of his research focused on the nature of juridical proof. He is a
member of American Law Institute, and he has chaired the Evidence Sec-

Craig S. Lerner, Reasonable Suspicion and Mere Hunches, 59 VAND. L. REV. 407 (2006).
Craig S. Lerner, Legislators  as   the   “American   Criminal   Class”:   Why   Congress   (Sometimes)
Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599 (2004).
3 Craig S. Lerner, The USA Patriot Act: Promoting the Cooperation of Foreign Intelligence Gathering and Law Enforcement, 11 GEO. MASON L.REV. 493 (2003).
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tion of the Association of American Law Schools. He was Vice Chair of
the Rules of the Procedure and Evidence Committee at the ABA, and he
has also served as a Commissioner of the Illinois Supreme Court.
Our third panelist is Christopher Wray, who was and is a litigator at
King & Spalding. He presently is the Chairman of the Special Matters and
Government Investigations Practice group, where he deals with securities
and fraud matters, as well as white collar criminal issues. For two years, he
worked as the assistant attorney general in charge of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Criminal Division. During that time, there was an effort to
address the wave of corporate fraud scandals, and he attempted to restore
some integrity to the United States financial markets, which I think has
been successful. As Head of the Criminal Division, he led investigation,
prosecution, and policy development in nearly all of the fields of federal
criminal law, specifically intellectual property piracy and cyber crime, and
racketeering.    He  has  played  an  integral  part  in  the  DOJ’s  response  to the
September 11 attacks and has played a key role in the oversight of the legal
and operational actions in the continuing war on terrorism. He spent from
1997 to 2001 in Atlanta as  an  Assistant  United  States  Attorney,  where  I’m  
sure he got a lot of criminal experience also, and he served as a law clerk in
the Fourth Circuit. He graduated from Yale as an undergraduate, and as a
lawyer.
Our fourth panelist—ladies last—is Carol Steiker. She is presently a
professor at the Harvard Law School. She graduated from Harvard, Radcliffe Colleges, and Harvard Law School. She served as law clerk to Judge
J. Skelley Wright, who is from New Orleans, on the D.C. Circuit, and also
to Justice Thurgood Marshall of the Supreme Court, and she got most of
her criminal law reality check serving as a public defender in the District of
Columbia, I would imagine. She has written numerous articles on criminal
law, criminal procedure, and capital punishment. Most recently, she served
on the Board of Editors for the second edition of the Encyclopedia of Crime
and Justice,4 and   she’s   working   on   two   lengthy   projects.      One   is   on   the  
changing face of capital punishment in America; the other one is on mercy
and institutions of criminal justice. She served as a consultant and expert
witness on issues of criminal justice for many non-profit organizations, as
well as for federal and state legislatures.
I  think  we’ll  have  an  interesting  afternoon.    Please  give  these panelists
your attention. After they address you, then the panelists will have the opportunity to cross-examine the other panelists, and we will then open the
floor to questions. Thank you very much.
PROFESSOR LERNER: Thank you. I was asked to go first because

4
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the thought was that I would defend originalism and present an ample target to my co-panelists.
Soon after the President nominated Harriet Miers to the Supreme
Court, Judge Robert Bork, as you may have seen, published a scathingly
critical editorial in the Wall Street Journal criticizing Miers for not being
an originalist.5 According to Bork, judges who are not originalists end up
legislating from the bench, and for originalists this is bad, obviously, because  it’s  an  illegitimate  enterprise. Judges, as we heard repeatedly during
the aborted Miers nomination, are charged with applying the law, not making it up.
Second, this enterprise is bad for functionalist reasons. Judges are not
picked or trained to assess the costs and benefits of newly minted public
policy rules, nor do they have staffs equipped to assist them in these endeavors. As we know, the staffs that Supreme Court justices have consist of a
quartet of fawning 27-year-olds straight from the intellectual hothouses of
Cambridge and New Haven.
A third argument for originalism is an aesthetic one. This is my favorite. Supreme Court justices should remain securely cosseted in their judicial robes. Originalism, as an interpretive methodology, constrains a freewheeling, let-it-all-hang-out jurisprudence that is aesthetically very bad for
the country. Criminal procedure provides many examples, I fear, of terrorist prudential deformities that do not pleasantly engage the eye. Questions
about police in criminal trials seem to fire the imagination of Supreme
Court justices far more than ERISA preemption issues, and they promptly
abandon the tedious constitutional text to ruminate on philosophy and morality.
Let me give you one example: Mapp v. Ohio6—of course, the grandfather of modern American criminal procedure. In concluding his decision
requiring the exclusionary rule in every state court in America, Justice
Clark cast off his judicial robes, revealing I fear the emaciated and unsightly  figure  of  the  philosopher  king.    “Our  decision,”  he  intoned  without  
the  slightest  hint  of  irony,  “[is]  founded  on  reason  and  truth.”7 On political
legitimacy, functionalist, and aesthetic grounds, Supreme Court justices
should wear traditional robes. Originalism is attractive because it provides
constraints against extrajudicial ruminations on reason and truth, ruminations that many Supreme Court justices are supremely ill suited to engage
in.
Yet, one cannot leave it at that. Of course, an obvious response to
Judge Bork in this argument so far is that I have posited a choice between
originalism and letting-it-all-hang-out jurisprudence between the two. Of

5
6
7

Robert H. Bork, Slouching Towards Miers, WALL. ST. J., Oct. 19, 2005, at A12.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Id. at 660.
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course, originalism is preferable. But more commonly, a choice confronting a judge today is not originalism versus letting it all hang out, but originalism—at least as some pedant might discover it—and following decades
of precedent that might have strayed far from the Constitution. To the extent that my aesthetic objection to non-originalism is a reaction to Arian
empty philosophizing, it might seem that a precedent-bound jurisprudence
is preferable to originalist recourse to first principles.
I think the issue is starkly posed in the criminal procedure context,
where you have a number of cases like Mapp,8 Miranda,9 and Katz,10 that
have essentially replaced the Constitution as guiding principles. Justice
Scalia has said that almost every originalist would adulterate the strong
medicine of originalism with a doctrine of stare decisis, but when does the
originalist hearken to the originalist voice of the Constitution, and when
does he follow meekly in the footsteps of his predecessors, however wayward  their  path?    That  is  the  question,  and  I  don’t  think  Justices  Scalia  and  
Thomas agree on that.
I   don’t   think   there’s   a   simple   algorithm,   a   scientific   solution to that
problem.    I  don’t  think  this,  however,  is  an  irrefutable  problem.    These  disagreements notwithstanding, originalism I think might most be modestly
cast as an interpretive tool to assist judges when considering how much deference is owed to prior decisions, and the appropriate level of caution or
enthusiasm and extent of the examining or limiting those precedents.
That’s  the  argument  for  originalism.
The basic criticism originalism, of course, in bare bones, is that the
cultural, technological, legal environment has been so transformed over the
past 210 years that the original meaning of the Constitution does not and
should not provide any or much guidance. My first reaction to this criticism is always to conceive it: if courts, and particularly the Supreme Court,
were in the business of fashioning policy solutions for all the ills that afflict
us, the Constitution, its text and its meaning, would indeed supply inadequate  guidance.    But  if  the  Supreme  Court’s  role  were  more  modestly  cast  
to be  judges,  I’m  not  so  certain  the  Constitution  is  radically  deficient.
On the descriptive claim that originalism does not play a significant
role in modern criminal procedure, it might be sufficient to note the remarkable uptake in references to 18th-century English and American police
and trial practices and treatises in Supreme Court criminal procedures over
the past 15 years. Of course, skeptics of originalism might counter that all
these references to Entick v. Carrington,11 Camden, Storey, Cooke—these
are all simply rhetorical parsley. There they are for show to satisfy aesthetes like me. Under this view, Justice Scalia is doing exactly what Wil8
9
10
11

Id. at 643.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765).
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liam  Brennan  and  Earl  Warren  did;;  he’s  following  his  moral  intuition,  but  
he’s  simply  covering  up  better.    I am not persuaded by this criticism.
There is ample evidence that originalism is doing independent work,
that it is driving many recent opinions. Academic critics who once mocked
what  they  called  to  Scalia’s  Law  and  Order  originalism12 have been proven
wrong again and again in recent years as he has voted on originalist
grounds to extend protections for criminal defendants. The case last term,
Crawford v. Washington, in which Justice Scalia overruled a 24-year-old
precedent and expanded the reach of the Confrontation Clause on originalist grounds, held that the Sixth Amendment required the exclusion of testimonial evidence, however reliable, unless the defendant was permitted to
cross examine him.13 Of course, the Apprendi14 line of cases were all designed to ensure, consistent with the original meaning of the Constitution
or what at least has been alleged to be the original meaning of the Constitution—I’m  not  so  certain  about  the  historical  materials  here—that juries, not
judges, make factual findings that justify conviction and punishment.
Another remarkable example of Justice Scalia as an originalist civil libertarian is his concurring opinion in Minnesota v. Dickerson,15 in which
he suggested that the uncertainty about the constitutionality of risks during
brief   interrogatories   stopped,   because   he   frankly   doubted   “whether   the  
fiercely proud men who adopted our Fourth Amendment would have allowed themselves to be subjected, on mere suspicion of being armed and
dangerous,  to  such  indignity.”16
Or finally, consider   Justice   Scalia’s   dissenting   opinion   in   County of
Riverside v. McLaughlin, where the Court considered the constitutionality
of a local practice of waiting as long as 48 hours before providing an arrested person with a judicial determination of probable cause.17 Scalia
noted  Storey’s  claim  that  the  Fourth  Amendment  was  “little  more  than  an  
affirmance of a great constitutional doctrine of the common law.”18 He lectured the majority that the Court should balance law enforcement interests
and privacy concerns only when confronted with novel issues of reasonableness.19 No balancing was appropriate in resolving these questions on
which a clear answer already existed in 1791 and has been generally adhered to by traditions of our society ever since.
Well, not surprisingly,  given  Scalia’s  view  of  the  Fourth  Amendment,  
12 Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of
the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 239 (2002).
13 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
14 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
15 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
16 Id. at 381 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
17 County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 59–71 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
18 Id. at 71.
19 Id. at 59–71.
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he has ridiculed many modern criminal procedure opinions, and perhaps no
decision has received more derisive abuse from him than Katz v. United
States.20 That was the case, of course, that involved a wiretap on a public
telephone booth. The Court, or at least Justice Harlan, held that the Fourth
Amendment protected—this was wonderful—actual subjective expectations of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable, or something along
those lines.21 As Scalia noted, this test is self-indulgent.22 It lacks any
plausible  foundation  in  the  text  of  the  Fourth  Amendment.    And,  “unsurprisingly,   those   ‘actual   (subjective)   expectation[s]   of   privacy’   that   society   is  
prepared  to  recognize  as  ‘reasonable,’  .  .  .  bear an uncanny resemblance to
those  expectations  of  privacy  that  this  Court  considers  reasonable.”23
Now, Katz, according to the familiar story, uprooted decades of perhaps already withering precedent, which had premised the Fourth Amendment on protection of property rights, not privacy interests. Chief Justice
Taft’s   opinion   in   Olmstead v. the United States24 is the classic originalist
statement  of  this  view.    Government  agents  in  that  case  tapped  Olmstead’s  
telephone lines, outside his home.25 And Taft, relying on what he regarded
as the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment, found no constitutional
violation, the simple reason being that there was no physical trespass on
Olmstead’s   property.26 Now   Taft’s   view,   I   don’t   think,   was   a   frivolous  
one. It would  seem  to  hew  closely  to  Lord  Camden’s  statement  in  Entick v.
Carrington, that “our law holds the property of every man so sacred that no
man can set foot upon his  neighbor’s  close  without  his  leave.”27
Also, the text of the Fourth Amendment, with its references to person,
houses, papers, and effects, arguably suggests that physical intrusion is a
necessary predicate for a Fourth Amendment violation. That was, I think,
Justice  Black’s  view,  dissenting  in   Katz.28 The story typically told in law
schools today is that this absurd, hypertextual connection between property
rights and the Fourth Amendment has been thankfully interred by cases
such as Katz, where the Supreme Court replaced the antiquated originalist
property paradigm with an updated modern privacy  paradigm.     It’s  a  nice  
story.      It’s   actually   something   of   a   fable,   as   Professor   Orin   Kerr,   who’s  
here, and may want to distance himself from everything I say, has written.29
Doctrinally, to a remarkable extent, the Fourth Amendment is still
about protecting property rights, not privacy interests. Police can fly over

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Id.
Id.
Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817 (1765).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531 (2005).
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your land in helicopters. They can insert undercover agents in your midst,
wearing  wires.    You  can  search  your  friend’s  house  and  car,  finding  stuff  
that you own, none of which would violate your Fourth Amendment rights.
So even muddled with cases like Katz, the originalist echoes can still be
heard in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
I   should   briefly   note   that   Scalia’s   originalism   in   the   Fourth   Amendment  context  is  not  the  same  as  Taft’s.   He seems more willing to translate
the Fourth Amendment to modern conditions, finding Fourth Amendment
violations even in the absence of physical trespass. This was of course illustrated in the Kyllo case, where Scalia found that the use of a thermal detection device to measure heat discharged from a home constituted a search,
and in the absence of a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.30
Kyllo, for me, was a disappointing opinion because it seems that Scalia, I think, abandoned a principle of rigorous originalism and seemed to
ground his decision incredibly on Katz—yes, the much mocked Katz. And
second, because Scalia did not, I think, give sufficient credence to Justice
Stevens’s  dissenting  objections  on pragmatic grounds that perhaps it is best
to leave to the legislatures the responsibility of monitoring emerging technologies. It might have been possible to craft something along the lines of
an originalist opinion there, that a thermal detection device was in effect
invading   Danny   Kyllo’s   castle,   and   if   the   ratifiers   of   the   Fourth   Amendment could be brought back and asked, what do you think of thermal detection devices, they would say this is as horrifying as a physical intrusion on
a home. Frankly, I must   say   I   don’t   find   this   particularly   persuasive.      I  
couldn’t  care  less  if  police  directed  thermal  detection  device  at  my  home.    
Other people might feel differently, and I urge them to lobby Congress and
state legislatures to convince them. I am just unsure why courts are involved in this enterprise.
The  sky  won’t  fall  if  the  Fourth  Amendment  were  restricted  to  property; that is, if we returned to originalist cramped vision of the Fourth
Amendment. Katz, for all the non-originalist flowery rhetoric, has been a
meaningless decision, as Professor Kerr suggested.31 On the narrower issue
confronted, Congress responded almost immediately by enacting Title III,
which actually extends even more protections than what is guaranteed by
the Fourth Amendment with respect to wiretaps.32
Very briefly, two originalist agenda items/pure fantasies—one, maybe
it’s  time  to  revisit  the  issue  of  incorporation.    You  know,  for  a  century  after  
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was not thought that the
Fourteenth Amendment applied each of the Bill of Rights protections
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)
See Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 279,
307 (2005).
32 Criminal Resource Manual, 27 Electronic Surveillance, Title III, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00027.htm.
30
31
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against the state exactly as they applied to the federal government. I think
this would be a very useful development, although perhaps unlikely.
Second, circuit riding—let’s  bring  it  back.    It  didn’t stop existing until
the mid-19th century. You look at the Supreme Court today; God knows
what the percentage of their docket is for criminal cases: a quarter, half?
None of them have any experience adjudicating criminal law trials. I
mean, to some extent Justice Breyer, but typically not. I think it would be
very useful for them to actually have to spend some summer months, instead of going to Salzburg, traveling the country and actually having to
hear  criminal  trials  and  see  what  it’s  like  to  apply  the Miranda rules they
dreamed up, with all their permutations, with all their exemptions. And
best of all—and here is where I think Judge Clement would appreciate
this—maybe it would be nice for them to have decisions that can be ruled
upon by the people who are generally in the business of being ruled upon
by them.
Thank you.
JUDGE CLEMENT: Thank you, Professor Lerner. You relax while
they shoot at you.
Professor Allen.
PROFESSOR ALLEN: Thank   you,   Judge   Clement.      It’s   a   great  
pleasure and honor to be here—the  honor  from  the  fact  that  I’m  a  great  enthusiast   for   the   work   done   by   the   Federalist   Society,   although   I’ve   never  
been  a  member.    I  shouldn’t  confess  this,  but  I  will  correct  this  deficiency, I
promise, as soon as we are done with this panel tonight—at least, unless
you will to the contrary by the time we are done.
I am very much also in the debt of the Federalist Society not only because of the tremendously valuable work that you do but because you produced three of my favorite people, my colleagues. Steve Calabrese and
Gary Lawson have been long-time colleagues of mine at Northwestern—
Gary unfortunately decided to go to that team that won the World Series
last year—and John McGinnis, who is presently at Northwestern. These
are wonderful people, and they reflect all the best values of the Federalist
Society.    They’re  always  open  to  new  ideas.    They’re  attentive  to  what  you  
have to say. They respond in interesting and helpful ways, and keep balance, which is what the Federalist Society, from my point of view as an
outsider, soon to be rectified, does.
Now, the issue of originalism is interesting, and you can see the attraction of originalism, or textualism, or literalism in lots of ways. And I think
Craig identified the most important of which, which is all of these are mechanisms or searches for ways to constrain judicial decision-making, which
otherwise to be unbounded and both unprincipled and inconsistent with

ORIGINALISM_AND_CRIMINAL_Law_Panel_277-306

286

Chapman Law Review

4/10/2008 6:46 PM

[Vol. 11:277

democratic decision-making and the like. There is also a related, much
more general point. There is an attraction to theorizing of any kind. Theorizing allows a mass of information or a complicated situation to be reduced to a manageable size. It often allows you to control that complex
problem or process; to predict its outcome; and to change things as you go
along. So all of these, I think, at both the discrete level, why originalism
itself is attractive and why theorizing more generally, are very critically
important.
The difficulty, though, is that what you arise—I’m  going  to  return  to  
this at the end of my remarks—when you theorize, you have to have a
model that captures the reality appropriately; not exactly, not precisely at
all respects, but appropriately for your purposes.    And  I  think  there’s  a  serious question about whether any relatively simplistic theory of constitutional interpretation does that with respect to the modern society in which
we live.
Now having said that, let me be clear about something. You can ask
three questions about anything, but certainly originalism. You can ask the
what, the why, and the should questions. You ask questions about descriptive  accuracy.    You  can  ask  questions  about  if  it  isn’t  or  is  descriptively  accurate, why it is or isn’t  descriptively  accurate.    And  then  you  can  ask  the  
should  or  the  justificatory  question,  you  know,  what’s  justified,  originalism  
or as alternative, and so on.
My self-conception, my self-conceit, if you will, is not that of a philosopher; it is that of a scientist. What interests me is how the system actually operates, statements that have truth value. I want to describe accurately
the legal process, predict it and so on, not attempt to engage in a normative
debate   about  justification.     So   I’m   going   to   address the first two of those
points,  the  “what”  and  the  “why”  questions,  and  leave  for  others  the  more  
normative  question  about  “should.”
One of the reasons this question is interesting today is because of two
important decisions, and Craig mentioned them both—Crawford on the one
hand and Apprendi through Blakely33 to Booker34 on the other. And I think
this   puts   on   the   table   a   question   of   whether   we’re   seeing   a   resurgence   of  
interest in originalism or increasing significance and so on. I have to tell
you, I  think  the  answer  to  that  question  is  absolutely  not.    It’s  as  clear  as  a  
bell that there is not much to be said about the significance of originalism
for constitutional criminal procedure. Even the two cases in which you
might plausibly make an argument that you see the influence of it—and by
the  way,  I  want  to  be  clear  about  something.    When  I  say  “the  influence  of  
it,”   I’m   talking   about   the  work   product  of   the   Court,   not   individual   statements by justices. I mean, there obviously are justices who make claims
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along these lines with some regularity, but the issue is when they command
a majority of the Court in a way that seems actually to solidify the significance of originalism.
Crawford v. Washington is a good example.35 That’s   the   only   case,  
the only clear-cut case, in which you have a majority of the Court seeming
to adopt an opinion that does, in fact, employ a very strong originalist language.      And   I   think   that’s  true.      On   the   other   hand,   what   you   need   to   be  
aware of is that Crawford is one of a long series of the Court struggling
with the relationship between the Hearsay Clause and the Confrontation
Clause. Now, it may turn out tomorrow or two years from now or ten years
from now that this really was the beginning of the originalist revolution in
criminal procedure. I have to tell you, given the complexities of that relationship, I think we have to hold our breath and wait, and indeed the Court
has already taken two cases this term in which I predict that they will make
clear that the parameters of Crawford are quite constricted. I may be right;
I  may  be  wrong.    We’ll  see.    But  you  do  have  to  realize  that  is  one  of  a  series of cases struggling with this relationship. Nonetheless, it is the one
case in which there is a clear majority adopting this originalist perspective.
In the Apprendi to Blakely to Booker line,  Scalia’s  opinion  does  try  to  
tie its results to an originalist argument. The originalist argument has virtually no evidence to support it. Indeed, in the opinion itself, basically the
argument is that although our originalist position has very little evidence,
your—in  particular,  O’Connor’s—alternative  has  none.    So,  it’s  like  a  relative plausibility theory. We have a psalm; you have none. This is not a
very robust originalist methodology.
Moreover,  what’s  often  neglected  when  thinking  about  originalism  in  
Apprendi line of cases, in particular, Booker, is this is presented as the federal   guidelines   that   haven’t   been   struck   down   on   originalist   grounds.      In  
fact, what the Court probably did in Booker was uphold the guidelines.
There are two opinions. The second is more important than the first. The
second is the remedial opinion. In that opinion, the Court concluded that
you could indeed—the guidelines may not be mandatory, but they could be
advisory and you can have appellate review of reasonableness of deviations
from the guidelines.36 There’s  no  reason  why  Congress  can’t  give  teeth  to  
the standard of review. If they do, essentially you end up with the guidelines in a somewhat different   vocabulary.      So,   that’s   not   very   strong   support for any kind of a robust originalism.
If you get away from these two cases and you look at the general lay
of the land, what you see are vast provinces in this territory that have virtually no connection to originalist points of view. Again, Craig mentioned
some of them. A Mapp and Katz regime in the Fourth Amendment is very
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distant from it. One of the cornerstones, really, the real cornerstone, I
think, is not Mapp but Gideon.37 That’s  actually  the  real cornerstone as to
interpretations of the meeting of habeas corpus, which—I   won’t   get   too  
technical here, but if we put aside habeas corpus,  it’s  Gideon which gave
rise to modern constitutional criminal procedure. You cannot justify the
Gideon line of cases in any remotely originalist way, and one of the important areas—not the entire area, but one of the important areas—of the Fifth
Amendment is Miranda.    It’s  the  same  thing.    I  mean,  it’s  about  as  far  from  
originalism as one can possibly get.
Nonetheless, to test this hypothesis, I decided to actually go through
the last two terms and look all the decisions again. I read them when they
came   out,   but   some   of  them   aren’t   in   my   area   of   significant  interest,   so   I  
went back and looked at them all. But what you get is a long list of cases,
in many of which there could have been originalist arguments and not a
single one was made. By far the most striking of these on the counter side,
on the counterbalance of the non-originalist, is Roper v. Simmons38—to my
eyes it is a shocking opinion, and why were you not more up in arms?—
maybe you were and maybe I missed it; I was out of the country. But you
were not up in arms about this, the conclusion by a majority of the court
with at least three members actually signing off on this, that it is up to them
personally to decide the appropriateness of punishment under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause.39 Now, I cannot imagine anything more like
what Professor Graglia was railing against earlier today and more inappropriate from an originalist position.
Now, I have two pages of notes, because one page is nothing but a
listing of the cases from the last two terms in which originalist arguments
might plausibly have been made—Fourth Amendment cases, confrontation
cases, discovery cases, all kinds of stuff—and in not one of those was there
a serious originalist argument. I am happy go through them if anyone is
interested, but I will not at this point. But just to mention a couple of those,
there are whole areas again that just have no relationship to any plausibly
originalist position. Think about the Brady line of cases. There are constantly Brady cases, discovery cases—that have nothing to do with what
was  in  anybody’s  mind  200  years  ago.
Think of the terror decisions, the three terror decisions—Hamdi,40 Padilla,41 and Guantánamo Bay.42 Again, not much there—there could have
been—but not much there are about originalist perspectives. Or, the Miranda decisions of two terms ago, Patane,43 Seibert,44 and to a lesser extent
37
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Fellers.45 Fellers is really a Sixth Amendment decision—again, no connection here. And I could—if in our discussion you want to talk about
them - give you some more examples. But if you look not at these two
opinions, only one of which   is   plausibly   originalist,   and   that’s   Crawford;
that’s   it.      So,   in   terms   of   the   what,   there   isn’t   much   there   to   suggest   that  
originalism is of any great significance, at least in terms of the decisions
being reached now. Now, the issue can be more complicated than that.
Maybe   some   issues   are   settled,   and   they’re   settled   because   of   originalist  
positions and so on, so I mean, there are some interesting things to talk
about here.
All  right,  so  that’s  the  “what”  question.    What  about  the  “why”  question? Well,  you  know,  there’s  a  theory  out  there  that  the  fields  I’m  interested in, constitutional and criminal procedure and evidence, are kind of
insulated from larger currents of constitutional law, in particular, and we
suffer from it. I have the exact opposite  view.    Now,  I  guess  that’s  not  a  
surprise. I think you constitutional theorists out there suffer from not having engaged with constitutional criminal procedure and evidence. Why?
Because these cases make you deal with the nitty-gritty of real life. You
know, in separation of powers cases, you can also often abstract away from
what  the  real  issues  are.    It’s  really  hard  to  do  that  in  the  criminal  cases,  the  
evidentiary cases, and so on.
And what am I getting at? Well, when you look at it from this bottom
of the heap perspective, which criminal procedure and evidence questions
make you look at—you  know,  what’s  really  going  on?    Who  did  what  there  
for  a  man,  what’s  going  on?    You  see  a  couple  of  interesting  things.    One  
you see—and there are two I want to make—one is how dramatically the
world has changed, and two, the implications of that for theorizing, the
point  I  said  I’d  come  back  to  at  the  end.
First of all, obviously some things are decided consistent with what
you might claim to be an originalist position. But a lot of what matters to
the criminal process exists in a world that simply was not contemplated either 200 years ago, or if you want to talk about the Due Process Clause,
150 or so years ago. My favorite example is wiretapping. No one, not
even Ben Franklin flying his kite in rough weather, was thinking about
wiretapping. So now, what to do with an originalist position when a problem simply was not contemplated?
Appeals and the right to counsel—there were some appeals in some
states in  various  ways,  and  very  odd  modern  points  of  view,  but  there’s  no  
view that appeals were a necessary part of a criminal process. The old
Western   slogan,   “give   them   a   fair   trial   and   hang   them,”   is   right.      There  
were no appeals. You gave them a fair trial, and you hanged them. In the
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late 1880s, criminal appeals were allowed in federal court for the first time.
Now, there were some peculiar ways you can sometimes get a review and
some states did different things and so on. But now much of the world centers on appeals. No one was thinking about this.
What   about   the   police?      The   police   didn’t   exist   in   the   United   States  
until the late 1800s. So now you have an investigative body that simply
didn’t   exist,   but   at   the   time,   these   procedural   protections   were   created in
the body in the Bill of Rights. Organized criminality was not an issue.
What about the distinction now that is pressing so much public policy between criminality and terror, or between terror and war? The tripartite relationship between those three was not really well thought out and contemplated.
Well, in any event, I could give other examples—organized criminality; that was not what people were thinking about when they were thinking
about  the  criminal  process.    It  just  was  not  on  anybody’s  radar screen. And
the world we now deal with is just not the world we had then. And more
importantly, there has been not just a change, which is a common factor in
these discussions, but in fact, things exist now that literally were not conceived of. Now at  that  point,  you  can  start  analogizing,  and  that’s  what  you  
do with respect to wiretapping. Some people respond by saying, well, reasonable  this,  reasonable  that.    Well,  you  can  start  an  analogy,  but  you  can’t  
formalize analogy. You can analogize in one way; I can analogize in
another. And there is no formal means of adjudicating over those analogies. That means you are divorced from any algorithmic conclusions driven by your methodology.
Now the last point, if I could have one more minute —
JUDGE CLEMENT: Yes.
PROFESSOR ALLEN:—one more minute. A cautious and hesitating one more minute, but—
JUDGE CLEMENT: You’re  the  math  major.
PROFESSOR ALLEN:—one more minute because I think this is really the most important point from my point of view, again, as a selfconceited scientist. Why do these theories seem to have so little bite, even
though you argue about them so vociferously? I think it is because they
misconceive the object of their theorizing.
Again, those of you who know about the literature in evidence, in particular, we know a fair amount about the relationship between complexity
and decision-making. And you can say some systematic things about what
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can be captured by deductive algorithmic top-down theories and what resists them. Issues like ambiguity, unpredictability, the significance of common sense, actually describe or predict the extent to which areas of law are
capture-able, or at least have been captured, by algorithms, like, for example, microeconomics, which does capture antitrust but does not capture
negligence.
Now, when you look at the constitutional interpretive process, it is
highly ambiguous, very unpredictable, and probably requires common
sense. So I would predict as a scientist that this is exactly the area that is
going to avoid algorithmic solutions. So, I think in fact what you do when
you start trying to reduce constitutional interpretation to a relatively
straightforward or simple theory is that you are neglecting that it simply
does not capture the reality of the object being theorized, and as a result, it
resists it.
So, I think from my point of view, from my own professional point of
view, that is the most interesting thing about this. From your point of view,
it is probably uninteresting entirely, and we can go on after this and talk
about normative questions about originalism and so on. But I did want to
emphasize it because what I predicted that no matter how much we talk
about this, you are going to continue to see exactly what I went through.
The Court has done it the last two terms, and it captures 50 years of their
jurisprudence, that it is going to raise these kinds of arguments as tools
when they are appropriate. But the idea that any particular tool, whether
it’s   originalism,   strict   construction,   textualism, whatever, will be a dominant theme and a dominant determinant of outcomes, is simply going to be
falsified by the facts.
Thank you.
JUDGE CLEMENT: I’m  not  sure  you  answered  the  “should”  question,  but  you’re  out  of  time.    But  you  can  use  it  in  your  rebuttal.
PROFESSOR ALLEN: Sorry.
JUDGE CLEMENT: Mr. Wray—Assistant Attorney General.
HON. MR. WRAY: Not anymore. I just saw some of my former colleagues in the Criminal Division, and I am busy frantically thinking whether I am about to repudiate some position I took, and so I am sure that they
will tell me I am being inconsistent with my own original understanding.
But I think when you start talking about something like originalism, to set
it up the way the Federalist Society always does, and which I think makes it
more interesting, is a pro-con kind of debate. It is probably sort of decep-
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tively simple because I do not think anybody who is a proponent of originalism, which I consider myself to be, advocates using originalism to the
exclusion of every other is interpretive tool, like textualism, looking at the
landscape of precedent, and so on so forth. So it has to be considered as
one of many tools, and not the only tool.
The second thing I guess I would say is that, if you are going to be
against it, then the obvious question comes up, well, what are you going to
propose instead? Craig went over that little bit at the beginning, and trying
to keep things within time limits went over it pretty quickly. But I think
the points that he summarized quickly are important, because as hard as it
may be sometimes to figure out what the original understanding was, if you
do not look at something like that, then I think you end up looking at something like what side of the bed the judge got up on that morning, and which
newspaper he likes to read the most, and which editorial page he subscribes
to the most and worries about getting hammered in the most. And that
starts to become, at least to my mind, a little bit more like the finger to the
wind judicial interpretation, which if you are trying to promote stability and
predictability  and  consistency,  if  you’re  trying  to  have  a  limited  role  for  the  
judiciary, I think you have to look at things like originalism. So I would
say to the critics of originalism, if not that, what else? And I would like to
hear the defense of what that would be.
But to say that using originalism in this arena in particular is a good
idea, does that mean that doing that by itself will answer the question before any given court in any given case? No, I think not. And does it mean
that you are even able to find the original understanding in every case? I
do not think so, either. But not being able to find something and just not
looking for it are two very different things. Like I said, if you are not going
to look for it, then you have got to wonder what else you are going to be
looking at.
The third thing I would say is that just to say that looking at the original meaning in the context of criminal procedure, does that mean that you
are necessarily going to only be looking at criminal enforcement techniques, investigative techniques, processes and procedures and so forth that
were in existence at the time of the framing, or at least contemplated at the
time of the framing? Again, I think not. I think the answer is somewhat
like what now Chief Justice Roberts said in his confirmation hearing,
which is where there are very broad terms reflecting broad principles that
the framers chose, I think I prefer to assume they did that deliberately
knowing that they were not going to be able to anticipate techniques and
technologies and so forth, but that they wanted to have some level of consistency in the principals in terms of how they were going to be applied for
all those unforeseen facts.
So, that to me starts to come down to what is it you are going to draw
from the historical evidence? Do you just look at it and say, well, they
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didn’t   contemplate   heat-seeking sensors, so forget all the original understandings of the Fourth Amendment? Well, I do not think so. But it does
make it a lot harder to figure out what you can draw. And there are things,
to take the Kyllo case as an example, where I think the original understanding helps limit just how far afield the court can get. It does not get you all
the way there; it does not get you to the final answer of the question. But
things like the sanctity of the home, the notion that the home is the sort of
quintessential protected location for search purposes, is a principle that you
can glean from that is historical evidence and keeps the Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence that the Court engages and from getting, I would argue, way
adrift.
I share some of the disappointment that some of the others have articulated, that the Court did not take that historical analysis as far as it could
in Kyllo. But I would argue the way to reconcile Kyllo with some of the
other cases in the same arena is that it is, in fact, based in part on original
understanding of the Fourth Amendment.
For example, that very principle—the   idea   that   a   man’s   home   is   his  
castle, and so on and so forth—if you put the Kyllo case and the heatseeking device used they are up against cases like Caballes,46 which involved detection dogs on things like cars, or the cave, the Dow Chemical47
case that was referenced earlier involving flyovers, the way to understand
those cases as being consistent with each other is based, I think, on that
principle that the home is different. There is obviously a lot more to it, but
I  don’t  think  saying  that the original understanding does not get you all the
way there is the same thing as saying it is irrelevant or inappropriate to use.
Another example in the Fourth Amendment context might be in the
context of seizure. Justice Scalia, I think, wrote a pretty persuasive opinion
for the Court in the Hodari D. case, in which he looked to the original
meaning  to  say  that  seizure  can’t  be  understood  to  include  a  guy  who  sees  a  
cop walking towards him and runs away with no physical force, not even
any physical touching, that that is not a seizure.48 It seems to me pretty
logical, and maybe they would have gotten that way without looking at the
original meaning, but I have to believe that doing so helped in that particular case.
That does not mean that original meaning is not messy, and some of
the cases you have heard about today illustrate that point. The sentencing
cases are a classic example. Although the Court purported to ground its rejection of the sentencing guidelines as then written on historical evidence—
I am no historical scholar, but from what I have seen—the historical record
is a lot murkier and a lot more unclear than the Court would suggest, and
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that right around the time of the framing, courts were moving away from
determinant sentencing into sentencing within a range. And essentially, the
criminal procedure in that very area was in flux at the time of the framing.
Therefore, you have to sort of look at, well, what was not in flux at the
time of the framing? Well, what was not in flux were certain things that I
think all the members of the Court seemed to agree on. One, a jury has to
find beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the offense; fine. But two,
the judges had pretty broad discretion to look at certain facts, to impose a
sentence within  the  range,  whether  that’s  zero  to  whatever  the  penalty  was.    
At least most of the members of the Court profess not to disagree with that
proposition.
So then, the question becomes the issue that was actually presented in
the case, which was if it is okay for a judge to sentence based on facts that
he or she alone finds at sentencing as aggravating or mitigating the defendant’s  conduct,  anywhere  from  a  range  of,  say,  zero  to  life,  it  seems  pretty  
clear that that is constitutional. All the guidelines do, in effect, is structure
or shape that discretion within the range. Is there any reason to think the
historical evidence suggests that that suddenly transforms what would otherwise be constitutional scheme into an unconstitutional one? And I did
not see anything in any of the opinions that bore on that point. So, again,
does that mean that the historical evidence is irrelevant? No, it just means
that it did not get the Court all the way to the answer. In that particular
case it left a morass that those of us who are on either side of the criminal
justice system are still unraveling.
Crawford,49 which was also mentioned, is another example of where it
gets pretty messy. But again, messy and irrelevant are not the same thing.
It is pretty clear that from the historical evidence that is recited in that opinion that the Roberts50 case, which essentially allows the admission of outof-court  testimonial  statements,  based  solely  on  a  judge’s  finding  of  reliability, trustworthiness, and so on. But to take it to the next step and sort of
categorically exclude all such statements is not so clear, and if you look at
those opinions, one of the things that I think is interesting is there is a pretty lengthy historical debate between Justice Scalia writing for the Court,
and Chief Justice Rehnquist on the other side also pointing to historical
evidence. The fact that there is a debate, I would suggest, means that—let
me step back. The fact that there is a debate over the historical evidence
does not mean that that evidence is irrelevant. It just means that it is harder.
But again, I come back to the point that I made at the beginning,
which is just because something is hard does not mean it is irrelevant, and
if you are not going to use something like originalism along with other
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tools like textualism, then you have to ask, what are people going to be using instead. And I think the reality is you pretty quickly degenerate into
judges using their own subjective policy preferences to fill the gaps that
they would otherwise be able to fill using originalism. So I would argue
that it is relevant, it is appropriate, but like anything else, it has its caveats
and qualifiers and limits to its utility.
Thank you.
JUDGE CLEMENT: Thank you, Chris.
I think Professor Steiker is   about   to   answer   Chris’s   question:   if   not  
originalism, what else?
PROFESSOR STEIKER: Actually, I was not planning to do that,
but I can try. I will. Ask me anything.
I am very happy to be here to participate in this event. I always admire and enjoy the events that the local and the national chapters of the Federalist Society put on, and I am very pleased to be here.
What I plan to do—though  I  will  accept  the  Judge’s  challenge  to  a  certain extent—was something a little bit narrower, perhaps either correctly or
incorrectly interpreting the point of this particular panel. The conversation
thus far has been at a very abstract level about the virtues and vices in general  of  originalism  as  an  interpretive  methodology.    And  I  think  we’ve  had  
a very interesting  discussion  that’s  pointed  out  most  of  the  main  things  that  
originalism has to say for itself and what people, the proponents of it, seek
to achieve by it and some of the concerns and the limitations of it. I guess
the question that I had in mind was, is there anything in particular about the
context of criminal procedure that would suggest that originalism is either a
more or less appropriate tool in the toolbox of interpretive moves.
I guess I was going to make a somewhat more modest point that, at
least in a certain large part of the context of criminal procedure—that is,
the context of the regulation of police practices generally, which is the entire scope, pretty much, of the Fourth Amendment, and part of the scope of
the Fifth and Sixth amendments as well, there are a lot of reasons to be
more skeptical about originalism than just generally as an interpretive methodology. I was going to point out three reasons why we might, in that
context, have more concerns about originalism as a tool than in others. But
I will also try to answer—in my twelve minutes or so—what, if not originalism,   then   what?      Because   I   think   the   “then   what”   has   been   implicit  in  
what has been said, and I will just try to make it a little more explicit.
So, what are the three reasons why I think the criminal procedure context is not welcoming soil for originalism as a methodology. One has to do
with   a   point   that   was   in   fact   Chris’s   point,   and   in   fact   Chief   Justice   Ro-
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berts’  point  during  his  confirmation  hearings,  which  is  that  not all parts of
the Constitution speak at equal levels of generality, and sometimes it seems
positively clear that the framers themselves were not seeking to constrain
future generations. Now, many people have sought to make this point generally about originalism. The framers themselves were not originalists and
didn’t  seek  to  bind  future  generations  to  their  particular  conceptions  of  the  
shape of constitutional prohibitions and rights.
But in the Fourth Amendment context, in particular, it is very hard to
think that the framers meant to bind future generations because it is one of
the few provisions of the Constitution that actually adverts to the idea of
reasonableness, or actually unreasonableness. But the proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures without further definition positively invites future generations and future constructions of reasonableness. A lot
of the debate in originalism is whether we ought to look at the common law
at the time of the founding, and there is some debate about which founding.
Is it the actual founding of the Constitution in 1789 or 1791? Or, is it the
later founding of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, through
which the Fourth Amendment was incorporated? So was it 1868, or was it
1791? But in either case, the question is what were the particular things
that were thought to be reasonable or unreasonable then, or do we take the
concept of unreasonableness and try to apply it to new—are we to think of
ourselves as bound by the particular things that were thought to be reasonable or unreasonable at the time? That is the first argument.
And it is somewhat ironic that—I had not thought about this in these
terms,  but  Ron’s  comments  made  me  think  that  it  is  somewhat  ironic  that  a  
bigger bite of originalism has been in the Fourth Amendment area, where
we have seen a lot of Fourth Amendment originalist opinions, at least at the
Supreme Court level, and fewer in areas where the text of the Constitution,
at least, seems to invite that much less, in the Sixth Amendment and all
criminal prosecutions. It is amazing the contortions the Supreme Court has
gone  through  to  interpret  “all”  as  meaning,  “well,  some,  but  not  every  single  one.”    So  it  is  a  little  bit  ironic  that  some  of  the  parts  of  the  Constitution  
that least invite broader conceptualization have gone the non-originalist
route, and the provision that seems to most invite it has been the object of a
lot of work of originalism.
In a piece that I wrote51 responding to an essentially originalist approach to the Fourth Amendment by Akhil Amar, who I know is here today, I said that there were two important changes in historical context from
the 18th to the 20th century that should really inform our idea of what
things are reasonable or unreasonable—searches and seizures under the
Fourth Amendment—and one of the two that I pointed out, which was
pointed out by Ron, is the development of police as a social institution.
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At the time of the founding, there was no such thing as professional
police forces. It was all an informal, unprofessional constabulary and the
duty  of  “watch  and  ward”  and  the  posse comitatus and  the  “hue  and  cry”  in  
the marketplace, there was no professional law enforcement. And the development of professional police forces in the mid-1800s, I argued in this
piece, necessitated a change in the way we thought about what kinds of
searches and seizures were reasonable and unreasonable.
The other change, a big change certainly from the 18th century, and a
change that precipitated the Due Process Clause, is the problem of racism
in the United States and having large populations of different races that
lived in cities and that were disproportionately or differently policed by
professional police forces also led to different concerns. These are somewhat different points that I made my article, but since almost no one here
probably has read that article, I have no hesitation with diverging from my
own prior views.
But the two more pragmatic points that I wanted to make that you
could generate from those differences have to do with the fact that the police provisions of the Constitution have audiences that are unique, and for
whom originalism is going to be very unhelpful as a way for them to figure
out either their constitutional duties or their constitutional rights. So, constitutional duties—who is the primary audience of the Fourth Amendment?
It is law enforcement. And it is a really serious problem to have an originalist methodology that tells law enforcement agents and institutions that
the way to figure out what your duties are is to get some staff historians and
find out what was permitted exactly at common law in, you know, the middle of the 18th century. I think this is really a problem, and you can see it
in many of the debates about individual provisions about what exactly the
history of the late 18th century showed.
How in the world are police departments supposed to train their forces
and predict the future trends in the Supreme Court, if originalism is the methodology? I would like to add a friendly   amendment   to   Craig   Lerner’s  
suggestion that the Supreme Court justices ride circuit. I would like them
to go on police patrol ride-alongs. Have them ride with the police and rule
from the back seat. You know, what can you do without being able to call
down to the Supreme Court librarian and have them bring up the common
law of 1782 for them to consult? So I think that is a real problem.
And the other problem is a more abstract version of the same problem,
which is that in order for law enforcement to be able to predict future cases—the way we do it now, the way we train as law professors, the three of
us here, what we drill and what you all will remember from your own days
from law school—happily, I hope, but perhaps not—is that the primary methodology that we teach is analogy. Now Ron criticizes theory, high
theory, as a general rule because he says analogy, deciding things by analogy, is insufficiently—what is the word he used? Algorithmic; I just like
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that as an adjective—insufficiently algorithmic.
But here, I would like to borrow a little bit from Chris. What is the alternative? When you consider what the alternative to deciding by analogy
is, each particular question requires that call down to the Supreme Court
library to find out what the practice exactly was here, in that particular context, in the 1700s. And if all we can do is fill in little points on the map,
one by one, by reference to historical practice, there is absolutely no way to
predict the future in any particular way. Right now, we can try to predict
by analogy.
So, the Supreme Court says you need a warrant to search a home.
You do not need a warrant to search a car. Do you need a warrant to search
a Winnebago? This was actually a question until the Supreme Court decided it.52 But in deciding whether you need a warrant to search a Winnebago, did you have to try to find out what the thought was about Winnebagos, or shall we say, covered wagons that people lived in back in the
1790s? Or could you try to reason by analogy: why was it that you needed
a warrant to search a home and why was it that you did not need a warrant
to search a car? And it is only if you allow decision by analogy that you
can have this kind of predictability, which is what I urge that in police practices is a much more important value—it is always an important value, but
it has the supreme importance, unique importance, in the context of police
practices that make originalism truly more problematic.
The other audience—this is my third point, and I think I may have to
stop here—but my third point is that the other audience of police practices,
aside from the police, is the policed—the people with whom the police
have the most and interaction. And the concern so far, one of the main attractions of originalism, and it is an attraction to me as well as to any thinking person, is the idea of constraint—constraint of judicial authority, of
democratic accountability, and the idea that we would have a written constitution that would constrain judges is of course a kind of legitimacy that is
extremely attractive.
But there is a flip side to legitimacy, and that is that constitutional adjudication appears to take seriously the concerns of the moment and the
concerns of people. And so, this is where the issue of race comes in. It is
impossible without some kind of normative discussion about what the real
problems are, as opposed to simply what the particular conceptions of the
framers were in 1791, that is necessary for the evolution of constitutional
rights to have legitimacy in the eyes of the people whose rights it delineates.
And I guess in this context, I think of the recent events in France over
the last few weeks, and the images on television of gangs of minority youth
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out of control and burning police departments and attacking police officers,
partly out of a sense of outrage that their concerns and their rights, if you
will, have not been taken sufficiently seriously, and that to have a kind of
constitutional discourse that refuses, eschews any talk of a normative basis
for rights, I think runs the risk of lack of legitimacy in this other way.
So, I am going to close with an example, and then ten seconds of response—I   think   I   have   implicitly   answered   the   “what’s   the   alternative”  
question. The example is the Supreme  Court’s  decision  in  Atwater.53 That
is what I refer to as the soccer mom case, the woman with her two kids in
the  pickup,  who  was  stopped  by  a  police  officer  because  they  didn’t  have  
their seatbelts on, and the police officer did a full custodial arrest and took
her away in handcuffs.54 And the question was, is it a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure for the police to conduct a full custodial arrest
for a merely fineable misdemeanor offense?55
This goes all way up to the Supreme Court, and judges and justices all
along the way disagree about whether or not this would have been considered reasonable in 1789. Ultimately, the Supreme Court decides that the
history does not render it unreasonable,56 but the lack of the ability of all
these judges, with all their law clerks, with all of their libraries, to come to
any  definitive  answers  should  give  us  pause  as  to  whether  or  not  that’s  really a good way to decide that question.
And then after the Supreme Court decides—Justice Souter for the majority decides, you know, we really cannot decide based on the history that
this was unreasonable, so what do we have to look at? We have to look at,
he says—and it is clear that the Court really wants to look at this—is this a
really big problem? Are there a lot of cops out there who are conducting
custodial arrests of people for merely fineable, non-jailable misdemeanors?
And the answer is no, it does not seem to be a very big problem. And he
basically said, call me if it gets to be a big problem and we will talk about it
then.
But  the  “call  me  if  it  gets  to  be  a  big  problem,”  the  idea  that  somehow  
the bigness of the problem, the extent to which this is a concern that this
should be something we should be concerned about, the inability of originalism to ask that question at all or to answer it, I contend is a problem.
Granted, it opens the door to what Chris might call policy preferences, but
it is only through frank discussion of the normative underpinnings of the
nature of constitutional rights can a certain kind of legitimacy attend to decisions of this kind.
So the question is, what is the alternative? The alternative, I have to
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say, is not a complete disregard of the constitutional text and saying, you
know, the Constitution says something about searches and seizures, and allows you to judge—I am not a judge, but if I were—allows me, the judge,
to decide whatever I want. It is rather a displacement of particular conceptions with a broader level of generality, with the idea of concepts and conceptions.
A lot of this work has been done up at the level of theory by people
like Ronald Dworkin, but I think that is the counter-originalist move, the
idea to move to a level of generality, at which the paticular conceptions of
the framers about reasonableness give way to a broader concept of reasonableness, which requires some normative underpinnings, some frank discussion  of  the  “shoulds,”  the  things  that  Ron  wanted  to  avoid,  but  I  think  
that constitutional adjudication cannot and should not avoid.
Thank you.
JUDGE CLEMENT: The last I heard—I admit I have not heard the
news this afternoon since we were driving in from Charlottesville—was
that in France they had immediately arrested, convicted, and were deporting these people. So that is a whole other constitutional procedure that we
will not be faced with, I have a feeling, since we do have a constitution.
Would any of the panelists like to give a very short rebuttal before we
open the floor to questions and answers?
Ron.
PROFESSOR ALLEN: Very briefly. I agree with Professor Steiker
that the police are one of the intended audiences of the Supreme Court. But
I guess the message is what police hear is not necessarily the message the
Supreme Court wants them to hear. And this is the functionalist point that
they are not equipped to monitor any of this. So take Miranda.57 Miranda
is not a bad rule in terms of monitoring the police and regulating them. It is
not a bad legislative rule; of course, it was not enacted by legislature. So
here is the problem. The Supreme Court is now in the business of sort of
evolving Miranda.
My favorite case is Oregon v. Elstad.58 This is this case in which they
had a non-Mirandized confession, then they gave the guy Miranda rights,
and then they get another confession.59 And so, the Supreme Court says,
you  know,  “this  is  okay.”60 This is 1985. Little did they know that for the
next 20 years, this was in police manuals; this is exactly what they taught:
57
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get a guy in, jam him up, get him to confess, then Mirandize him, then get
another confession. It happened for 20 years before the Supreme Court
knew about this in the Siebert case61—so the whole point is that if this is
done legislatively, there is probably a better equipment for monitoring and
checking it.
And finally, on the reasonableness point, I agree; reasonableness
seems to invite a kind of balancing of privacy interests versus law enforcement   needs.      It   is,   I   think,   checked   by   this   person’s   papers,   houses,  
and effects, so I think that is a cabining of what is being talked about. And
also, I think reasonableness, to me—since it involves this balancing, again
returning to my corporation point—to me, it raises the question of why is
the Supreme Court dictating a uniform police manual given the fact that
reasonableness might differ in Utah and in inner-city Washington, DC. I
mean, it seems to me this is crying out for local jurisdictions to evolve differently. And so, I will leave it at that.
JUDGE CLEMENT: Thank you.
Yes, Chris.
HON. MR. WRAY: I guess I wanted to respond to the same point,
but in a slightly different way, which, as I said before, if the question is not
originalism, then what, and what I heard was normative underpinnings,
Dworkin, the concerns of the moment, and as somebody who has actually
spent a good part of my career as a prosecutor working with the police and
law enforcement, sometimes in the process of training them, I would not
suggest for a minute that studying the common law and Blackstone and
everything else is something I would recommend for the local police officer. But most of them learn from lawyers working with them in their jurisdictions, and most of those lawyers, and the police who work with them,
would feel far more comfortable trying to figure out and predict where they
can go with something like originalism as part of the calculus, rather than
worrying about whether they draw this judge or that judge, or are they
going to be in Los Angeles or Richmond? And so I guess I would say at
the end of the day, is it perfect? No. But is it superior? I would say yes.
As to the discussion of the situation in France, I guess I just cannot
help but remark that it reinforces my view that that is why we should not be
looking at French law.
PROFESSOR LERNER: Are you done, Chris?
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HON. MR. WRAY: I am.
PROFESSOR LERNER: I would like to just sharpen this discussion
a little bit with four quick points. I may be the outlier here, but these kinds
of conversations seem to make sense to me only if the theory that is been
advanced has a sharp edge to it. That is, originalism or textualism or whatever it is that you are talking about dominates over other things, because if
the issue is instead, is originalism or textualism or whatever a variable to be
taken into account in a judgmental process, that is banal. Of course it is.
No one is going to deny those points. It becomes uninteresting.
Second, I just do not understand an argument that says something
along  the  following  lines:  “the  first  five  steps  of  the  argument  can  be  deductive and the last two can be non-deductive,”   which   sounds   to   me   like  
what one is saying when it says originalism takes us part of the way but not
all the way. I mean, that sounds like you have assumptions, you deduce
things from them, you get to step four in the argument, but then step five
and step six are not deductive. Well, if they are not deductive, you have no
reason to think the conclusion bears any relationship to those assumptions
that began that deduction. So I am literally mystified by what that might
mean.
Third, to be clear, I was not attacking analogy—not that anybody
thought I was—I was describing analogy. You cannot formalize it. That
does not mean it is not useful. Analogical reasoning is terribly useful. So
are conventions, so is common sense, in a judgmental process. But when
you shift from judgmental terms to analytical terms, back to deduction and
hard edges, you have a different story, a different problem.
And fourth—this leads me to just my last point—no one is claiming
that things like originalism should be completely disregarded. To say it is
not an entire story is not to say the opposite, that it is completely irrelevant.
Again, in a judgmental context, of course original meaning and all these
other things plausibly can matter. Maybe you want to say they should matter. It is okay with me. To me, the interesting question is, how do you go
about regulating this complex process?
JUDGE CLEMENT: Thank you. If you have a question, you need
to get in line. We have two people lined up. And let me remind you, the
focus is on the question, not the statement.
Yes sir.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: My name is Ken Bishop. My question  is  simple.    What  does  “the  people”  in  the  Fourth  Amendment   mean?    
With regard to the French situation, are those  members  of  “the  people,”  if  it  
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were in the United States? With regard to illegal aliens, undocumented
workers, people who do not contribute to the society in the United States,
should they be protected by the Fourth Amendment? This issue is raised
by Chief Justice Rehnquist in the Verdugo62 case. I think it was about a
1995 case. And I would like the members of the panel to address the
meaning  of  “the  people.”
JUDGE CLEMENT: By inclusion or exclusion?
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Whichever way it pleases them.
PROFESSOR LERNER: When I used to teach criminal procedure, I
loved that because I remember in that case, Chief Justice Rehnquist says
“people”  is  a  term  of  art,63 and we see it first in the Preamble, so it gives
me an opportunity to sing what I learned. “WE THE PEOPLE of the United
States, in  Order  to  form  a  more  perfect  Union,  establish  justice”64—and so I
think his point there is that the people obviously means us, Americans here.
So that is the argument that we should not extend the Fourth Amendment
rights to outsiders, I suppose. But I am not sure if others on the panel
would agree with that.
HON. MR. WRAY: Do you remember the facts of Verdugo?
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: I confess, not.
HON. MR. WRAY: A drug trafficker was arrested by the DEA in
Mexico and brought to the United States and incarcerated.65 He was raised
in the United States. It was an unreasonable search and seizure issue, and
the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  found  that  he  was  not  “a  member  of  the  people,”  
and therefore he had no Fourth Amendment rights. I think that might be a
good way of handling undocumented aliens.
JUDGE CLEMENT: Did you have a comment, Ron?
Thank you, sir. Next.
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AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: With respect to search and seizure, do
you see probable cause warrant requirements as consistent with originalism? And do you view originalism with respect to reasonableness as a
question of determining what was thought to be reasonable at the time under historic circumstances, or reasonableness as an issue to be determined
by juries in civil damages actions without immunity?
PROFESSOR ALLEN: Let me answer that one—
JUDGE CLEMENT: All right, Ron.
PROFESSOR ALLEN: —because I can say a good word for originalism. Well, I could look at the text and see probable cause in warrants
there, so I am pretty sure they were thinking about probable cause and warrants. Of course, that answers very little as to what they thought that meant
and how we should construe the clause, but sure, they were there.
JUDGE CLEMENT: Carol.
PROFESSOR STEIKER: Well, I mean, this is actually the subject
of the article, the debate,66 that Akhil Amar and I had these many years ago
because he argues that although warrants and probable cause are in the
Constitution, they actually are in there to limit the use of warrants, not to
enshrine warrants as the gold standard for constitutional reasonableness,
because what courts have done is read the two clauses together: there shall
be no unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause. So, Professor Amar, who took an essentially originalist approach, argued that probable cause and warrants were actually a
way of limiting the warrant; the warrant was a bad thing; and the Fourth
Amendment limited the use of warrants as opposed to enshrine to them as
the ultimate standard.
I actually—there are many other historians who have disagreed with
him on that and there is a range historical debate about what—this goes to
my point about, if historians cannot agree, this is one of the problems of
originalism because there is a huge debate among historians about the relationship of the two clauses of the Fourth Amendment. I argued that there
were reasons of changed circumstance, that the conception of reasonableness should let us consider things like professional police forces and problems of racism, something that originalism, that the whole originalist de66 See generally Akhil R. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757
(1994); Steiker, supra note 51.
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bate has to elide because it is just not relevant to the question of the
tionship between warrants and probable cause.
JUDGE CLEMENT: Thank you.
Yes, sir.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: I am wondering if an originalist perspective in criminal procedure should perhaps incorporate a Michael H.67
approach to the level of generality question, which would then set the preference towards the lowest level of generality in order to achieve a more
restrained judicial interpretive method.
JUDGE CLEMENT: Any comments?
PROFESSOR LERNER: I  think  that’s  my  position,  but—I embrace
that, yes.
HON. MR. WRAY: I mean, all these questions are good questions,
but they are just reiterating the problem. There are lots of ways to constrain or to liberalize judgment, right? That might get one good one. And
it is hard to imagine how you would think systematically about that without
being pragmatic from beginning to end. You would ask questions—“what
would the consequences of that be? What would be the consequences of
the  alternatives?”—and so on. And as soon as you start doing that, unless I
am missing something, you give up any claim to originalism, not that I
heard you arguing for it, but you give up any claim to originalism.
PROFESSOR ALLEN: I thought the point was that originalism is
“look  at  the  plain  text  through  the  original  meaning,”  and  I  think  the  argument would be that if you are doing that, you discover that the Constitution
does not cover as many things as perhaps now the Supreme Court has interpreted it to mean. So it would effectively result in greater judicial restraint. I mean, it is not inconsistent with originalism.
HON. MR. WRAY: I did not say it was inconsistent with originalism. I said it was not derivable from it or driven by it. It is consistent with
lots of theories.

67

See Michael. H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).

ORIGINALISM_AND_CRIMINAL_Law_Panel_277-306

306

Chapman Law Review

4/10/2008 6:46 PM

[Vol. 11:277

JUDGE CLEMENT: All right. Can we have a round of applause for
our excellent panelists.
(Panel concluded.)

